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Margin Requirements and Systemic Liquidity Risk
Abstract
We develop a model in which margin procyclicality and the propensity for liquidity hoard-
ing interact to generate a systemic liquidity crisis. In this model, banks lend and borrow
in the interbank market to mitigate liquidity risk and trade derivatives contracts in the
OTC derivatives market to mitigate market risk. The daily mark-to-market of derivatives
contracts results in daily margin calls that banks cover using high quality liquid assets. We
find that distress due to margin procyclicality in the derivatives market can spillover to the
interbank market leading to systemic liquidity risk. Interconnectedness further amplifies the
effects of systemic risk within the interbank market. The model shows that central clearing
might increase the possibility of systemic liquidity risk due to tight margin requirements
and the timing of cash flows required from banks. We also find that haircut levels affect the
possibility of systemic liquidity risk, and highlight the potential role of a market maker of
last resort in limiting this possibility.
Keywords: Margin Procyclicality, Funding Liquidity Risk, Systemic Risk, Contagion, Networks,
Agent-Based Modelling.
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 has highlighted the threats of interconnectedness to the
stability of the financial system. In the aftermath of this crisis, central clearing of all
standardized derivatives contracts has been enacted to reduce interconnectedness in over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets (Yellen, 2013).1 In addition, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) has issued similar margin requirements for non-centrally cleared
derivatives (BIS-IOSCO, 2013, 2015). As a result, the OTC market participants are now
required to make margin payments at least daily in response to changes in the market
value of their derivatives contracts.
In this paper, we analyse the impact of margin requirements on funding liquidity risk
of the OTC derivatives market participants. Previous work has focused on counterparty
credit risk as in Acharya and Bisin (2014) who show that centralized clearing mechanisms
provides transparency of trade positions which eliminates counterparty risk externality,
and Loon and Zhong (2014) who suggest that introducing central clearing in the CDS
market lowers counterparty credit risk and improves post-trade transparency and trading
activity. In contrast, we consider the overlooked impact of margin requirements on fund-
ing liquidity risk of market participants. In particular, we consider margin procyclicality
during times of high market volatility as a side effect of tight margin requirements. We
focus on a specific question that has recently risen to the top of policy agendas: how
does margin procyclicality in conjunction with propensity for liquidity hoarding affect the
systemic risk propagation in the financial network of the interbank market?
The impact of margin requirements on funding liquidity risk is a key concern for
policy-making. On the one hand, variation margin which is required to be posted daily
is significant compared to initial margin which is required only at the inception of a con-
tract. According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), at the
end of first quarter of 2017, the initial margin and variation margin posted by derivatives
dealers are estimated at $280.5 billion and $1131.2 billion, receptively (ISDA, 2017). On
1The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 in the US and the
European Market Infrastructure Regulation of 2012 in Europe both mandate central clearing of certain
standardized and eligible OTC derivatives.
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the other hand, margin requirements focus on reducing counterparty credit risk through
the mandate of daily mark-to-market and tight credit support annexes (CSA). Given that
the amounts of variation margin calls can be large, there is significant liquidity risk from
tight CSAs.
We develop a model that considers the impact of margin procyclicality on funding
liquidity risk in the spirit of the seminal work of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
who model the interaction between market liquidity and funding liquidity in centralized
markets. They show that, under certain conditions, interbank haircuts are destabilising
and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity
spirals. In the same vein, the ability of market participants in our model to meet margin
requirements depends on their availability of funding. In our model, counterparty credit
risk is mitigated by requiring banks to post daily cash margins to reduce exposure at
default. If counterparties do not have sufficient cash to meet a margin call, they become
distressed.
Our model considers bank behavior in both the OTC derivatives and the interbank
markets. As in Faulkender (2005), we assume that banks trade in the OTC derivatives
market for both hedging and speculation purposes. We also consider herding behavior in
the interbank market as a driver of contagion similar to Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008).
They show that banks engage in herding behavior in order to minimize the effect of bad
information about other banks on their own borrowing costs while obtaining funding from
depositors. In our model, banks engage in herding behavior while they raise liquidity and
they have to decide between withdrawing their lending to other banks in the interbank
market and using their less liquid assets as collateral to obtain funding.
Our model is populated with heterogeneous banks with varying features of size, bal-
ance sheet compositions, market risk exposures, and risk aversion. Banks trade deriva-
tives contracts with each other in order to manage their exposures to market risk. A
bank selects the direction of a derivatives contract based on its own risk aversion and
idiosyncratic market risk exposure. For ease of exposition, we focus on the case of two
types of banks with respect to risk aversion. The first is high risk-averse banks which
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aim to hedge their idiosyncratic market risk exposures and maintain net fixed interest
rate exposure. The second is low risk-averse banks which speculate on market interest
rate movements and accept to have net variable interest rate exposures.
We also show how the theory of multilayer networks can be used to analyze the
spillover of distress from one segment of the financial market (OTC derivatives) to an-
other one (interbank). In particular, we represent the OTC derivatives and interbank
markets as two directed networks, where some banks participate in both networks while
others participate in only one out of the two networks. We quantify the credit expo-
sures that result from banks’ derivatives positions in a network setting. These exposures
change with changes in the market interest rates which leads to margin calls in order to
reduce exposures at default. We then use this model to investigate some of the policy
implications of margin requirements. To this end, the general approach followed is to
perturb the OTC derivatives market with an interest rate shock and analyse the dynam-
ics of contagion and systemic risk within the interbank market.
We find that margin procyclicality can lead to the onset of a systemic liquidity cri-
sis within the interbank market. Furthermore, Our model highlights the mechanism by
which margin procyclicality can induce liquidity hoarding contagion in the interbank mar-
ket. When a financially distressed bank refuses to rollover its current overnight lending
to other institutions in the interbank market, it effectively transfers its distress to those
institutions. As more institutions decide to hoard liquidity, a systemic liquidity crisis
propagates within the interbank market. The model also shows that contagion can arise
endogenously due to banks’ propensity for hoarding liquidity during distress times. This
contagion dynamic is thus characterized by a self fulfilling process among banks.
We also use the model to explore the impact of other factors on distress spillover and
systemic liquidity risk. For instance, we show that central clearing might in fact increase
the possibility of a systemic liquidity crisis due to tight margin requirements and the
timing of cash flows required from banks. Also, consistent with previous evidence, the
model predicts that interconnectedness amplifies the effect of systemic risk within the
interbank market. Furthermore, the model shows that haircut levels affect the possibility
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of a systemic liquidity crisis, and highlights the potential role of a market maker of last
resort in limiting this possibility. Finally, the results of our model illustrate the tension
between the micro-level decisions of individual banks about their interbank lending and
the macro-level outcomes of these decisions in the form of systemic loss that results from
the cost of withdrawing interbank loans.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of related
literature. Section 3 presents the market setup. Section 4 provides a model to analyse
contagion and systemic risk due to margin procyclicality. Section 5 provides an overview
of the model calibration and validation. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2. Related Literature
Assessing the impact of the central clearing mandate and subsequent margin require-
ments on the OTC derivatives market has brought about much debate among academics,
market participants and policy makers alike. Much of the discussions have involved the
impact on collateral demand with a focus on the trade-off between the benefits of mul-
tilateral netting within a class of contracts against lost bilateral netting benefits across
different classes. Duffie and Zhu (2011) are among the first studies to explore this trade-
off. Their analytical framework highlights the role of the market network structure and
netting arrangements in determining the change in collateral demand. Another strand of
research has focused on counterparty credit risk. For instance, Acharya and Bisin (2014)
shows that centralized clearing mechanisms provide transparency of trade positions which
eliminates counterparty risk externality. Similarly, Loon and Zhong (2014) suggest that
introducing central clearing in the CDS market lowers counterparty credit risk and im-
proves post-trade transparency and trading activity. In contrast with previous work, we
focus on the critical impact of margin requirements on funding liquidity risk. An impact
that arises due to margin procyclicality which occurs when margin requirements rise at
times of market stress, leading to even more stress.
Our paper contributes to the growing body of literature on financial contagion and
systemic risk. We adopt a balance sheet approach similar to what is followed in the
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strand of literature on contagion that focuses on default cascades due to direct credit
interlinkages among banks and solve for equilibrium as a fixed point mapping (see e.g.
Eisenberg and Noe, 2001; Furfine, 2003; Freixas et al., 2000; Allen and Gale, 2000). We
deviate, however, from this strand of literature in that we do not attempt to model cas-
cade defaults due to payments shortage. Instead, we attempt to model distress cascades
due to funding runs. Yet, another strand of literature use a similar balance sheet setting
to model common asset holdings as a transmission mechanism for contagion (see e.g. Ci-
fuentes et al., 2005; Krishnamurthy, 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 2011; Caccioli et al., 2015).
Liquidity hoarding is one of the main channels through which financial contagion
spreads. We contribute to this literature by developing a model that illustrates liquid-
ity hoarding due to margin procyclicality. Our work is closely related to the model of
Gai et al. (2011) in which liquidity hoarding in the interbank market arises due to ex-
ogenous shocks to haircuts. We extend their framework to study the impact of margin
procyclicality on funding liquidity risk and analyse its potential role in originating liq-
uidity hoarding contagion in the interbank market. Similarly, Acharya and Skeie (2011)
suggest that a bank’s propensity to hoard liquidity in the interbank market is a function
of its own rollover risk. The same notion is extended more in Acharya et al. (2011) whose
model provides a micro-foundation for the funding risk of financial institutions with an
extreme maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. Anand et al. (2012) study
bad news propagation within the interbank market and show how funding maturity and
network structure interact to generate systemic financial crises. Brossard and Saroyan
(2016) show that banks liquidity influences the overnight rates in the interbank market
and show that this is probably explained by hoarding and short-squeezing behaviors.
Another group of studies on liquidity hoarding uses information-theoretic models that
combine liquidity shortages and Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) to study flight to
quality episodes Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008). Similarly, Bolton et al. (2011)
provide a model to determine the equilibrium mix of banks cash reserves and liquidity
obtained through sales of assets. Allen et al. (2009) show that it might be constrained
efficient for banks to hoard liquidity if there is an increase in aggregate uncertainty about
aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand. Battiston et al.
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(2012) highlight the role of connectivity in systemic risk propagation and show that a
financial network is resilient to shocks to a specific limit, beyond which the network con-
nectivity might exacerbate the systemic risk propagation. Diamond and Rajan (2011)
show that banks might become illiquidity seekers to avoid realized losses due to asset fire
sales and in anticipation of asset price recoveries. Eross et al. (2016) find evidence of
endogenous responses and spillovers within the interbank market. Lopez-Espinosa et al.
(2013) examine the impact of bank-specific factors on its solvency risk and show that
funding risk is the main driver of systemic risk.
Our paper contributes also to the literature on procyclicality. One of the earliest mod-
els in this area is by Grossman and Miller (1988) which determines an equilibrium level of
market liquidity based on the supply and demand for immediacy. In the same spirit, the
seminal work of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) links market liquidity and funding
liquidity and shows that both margin spirals and losses spirals might result endogenously
due to procyclicality. Our paper is also related to studies on margin procyclicality (see
e.g. Murphy et al., 2014, 2016) and price procyclicality (see e.g. Danielsson et al., 2012;
Danielsson and Zigrand, 2008). Another strand of models on procyclicality focuses on the
link between leverage and market volatility. While some models focus on the endogenous
determination of leverage when assets are used as collateral (see e.g. Geanakoplos, 2010;
Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2012; Geanakoplos and Pedersen, 2012; Aymanns and Farmer,
2015), others focus instead on the impact of procyclical leverage on systemic risk (see e.g.
Gorton, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Tasca and Battiston, 2016).
Our paper contributes also to the strand of literature that suggests that banks behav-
ior play a pivotal role in systemic risk propagation during distress times. For instance,
Jones (2001) uses a network framework to model foreign exchange market trading de-
cisions. Their model captures some behavioral aspects of currency trading and applies
to arbitrage, hedging and speculation of currency risk. van den End and Tabbae (2012)
investigate the behavioral responses by banks during the recent crisis. They show that
these responses have been increasingly dependant across banks and provide an evidence
of herding in the interbank market during the crisis. They also show that banks deci-
sions regarding balance sheet adjustments have been procyclical. Other studies suggest
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that banks’ decisions in the OTC derivatives market are motivated by both hedging and
speculation. For instance, Géczy et al. (2007) use survey data and find that nonfinancial
firms that have high earnings management incentives are more likely to use derivatives for
speculative purposes. Additionaly, Chernenko and Faulkender (2012) decomposes firms
use of swap market to manage interest rate risk into hedging and speculation. Similar
evidence is provided by Faulkender (2005) and Carter and Sinkey Jr (1998). Moreover,
Gao et al. (2015) investigate the impact of the network structure on optimal hedge de-
cisions and find that network features play an important role in determining corporate
hedging decisions.
3. The Market Setup
In this section, we set up the market and develop a baseline model for the interactions
between participants in this market.
3.1. Market Participants
The market consists of N banks and a single central counterparty denoted by H.
Banks operate in both the OTC derivatives market where they trade derivatives contracts
and in the interbank market where they can lend and borrow from each other. The
liabilities of each bank are composed of interbank liabilities LBi representing funding
obtained from the interbank market (e.g. repo); other liabilities LOi ; and capital Ki. On
the assets side, a bank has interbank assets ABi representing funding extended to others
in the interbank market (e.g. reverse repo); high quality liquid assets AHLi ; low quality
liquid assets ALLi ; and other assets A
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Furthermore, the OTC market includes a single central counterparty denoted as H
that provides central clearing services to banks. By clearing a derivatives contract, the
central counterparty simultaneously becomes a counterparty to each one of the original










where XHi is the credit exposure of the central counterparty H to bank i, and XiH is the
credit exposure of bank i to central counterparty H.
3.2. Market Network
The market network is comprised of two layers: the OTC derivatives layer and the
interbank layer. Both layers follow a core-periphery structure.
3.2.1. Network Construction
Craig and von Peter (2014) provide a formal way of constructing a core-periphery
network using a block model by which they represent the interbank market. In their
model the core banks interact (i.e. lend and borrow) with each other and with other
periphery banks. The model sets some restrictions on constructing the network: i) it
requires that a core bank be connected to all other core banks; ii) it allows interactions
between core and periphery banks; and iii) it does not allow connections between any pair
of periphery banks. However, not all financial networks show this exact core-periphery
structure. Anand et al. (2017) show that some actual core-periphery financial networks
can deviate greatly from a perfect structure as that one suggested by Craig and von Peter
(2014).
We use a modified version of the block model of Craig and von Peter (2014) to
construct both layers of the market network. We relax the first restriction to allow
for high probability of connection among core banks but not necessarily to produce a
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where block CC represents the interaction among core banks with a connection proba-
bility of ρCC which is expected to be high, blocks CP and PC represent the interactions
among core banks and periphery banks with connection probabilities of ρCP and ρPC
which are equal and are expected to be low, while block PP represents the interaction
among periphery banks which we restrict its probability ρPP to zero. Core banks are
determined based on their relative size in the network.
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Thus, we construct a market network comprising of two layers. The first layer rep-
resents the interbank market. The probability of a connection between two core banks
in this layer is equal to ρCC . Also, the probability of a connection between a core bank
and a periphery bank is set to ρCP . The number of core banks is determined from an
empirical data on interbank network as shown in section 5.1. A wiring algorithm is then
used to initialize the connections between banks which generates the adjacency matrix
[Θij]{i,j=1,2,...,N}. Links in the interbank layer represent interbank loans, where A
B
ij is a
loan extended from bank i to bank j. The value assigned to each link depends on the rel-
ative value of the tow banks connected by this link. The value of an interbank loan given














i . Finally, total interbank
assets equal total interbank liabilities given that a bank’s interbank liability is another
bank’s asset.
The second layer represents the OTC derivatives market and depicts the long term
relationships in the OTC derivatives market. This layer consists of N banks and a single
central counterparty. Each link in this layer represents a potential counterparty from
which a bank can choose to enter a derivatives contract with. The number of core banks
is determined from empirical data on an OTC derivatives network as shown in section
5.1. A wiring algorithm is used to initialize connections between banks. All core banks
are connected to the central counterparty, while they are connected to each other with
a probability ρCC . Periphery banks are connected to core banks with a probability ρPC ,
but they do not connect to each other or the central counterparty. It is worth noting,
though, that core banks and the connections of each bank are not necessarily the same
in both the OTC derivatives and the interbank layers.
3.2.2. Network Connectivity
We use two measures of centrality that are widely used in network analysis to measure
interconnectedness of a network: density and degree centrality (Newman, 2010). Density
provides a measure of the overall connectivity of the network. It is estimated as the ratio
of actual links to the total number of possible links in the network. A rough estimation
of this measure can be obtained from the adjacency matrix of each layer of the network.
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Let d be the density of the interbank layer, it can then be estimated as:
d =
ρCC ⋅NCoreB ⋅ (NCoreB − 1)/2 + ρCP ⋅NCoreB ⋅ (N −NCoreB)
NCoreB ⋅ (NCoreB − 1)/2 + NCoreB ⋅ (N −NCoreB)
(3)
where NCoreB is the number of core banks in the interbank layer. Furthermore,
degree centrality provides a measure of the connectivity of an individual bank. In a given
network, degree ki of a bank i is the total number of links it has with other banks. We
also distinguish between two measures of degree centrality in the interbank layer. The
in-degree kini (out-degree k
out
i ) which represents the number of links in which the bank is






Both measures can be estimated for the OTC derivatives layer similar to the interbank
layer.
3.3. OTC Derivatives Market Dynamics
In this section, we describe a baseline model of interactions between banks in the
OTC derivatives market.
3.3.1. Trading Strategies
Banks can use the OTC derivatives market for hedging or speculation as shown by
Faulkender (2005). We further assume that a bank’s decision to hedge or speculate is
determined by two factors, namely its idiosyncratic market risk exposure and its level of
risk-aversion.
A bank with a given risk exposure may decide to hedge this exposure by taking a posi-
tion in the opposite direction, or to speculate on market movements by taking a position
in the same direction. Other banks with no risk exposures to manage still can speculate
on market movements. We further assume that all banks are risk-averse, meaning that
they accept to take more risk only if justified by higher expected returns. However, they
have different levels of risk-aversion. That said, we divide banks into two types low risk-
averse and high risk-averse. The decisions of high risk-averse bank are limited to hedging,
while low risk-averse bank can take hedging or speculation decision.
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Based on the combinations of idiosyncratic exposure and risk-aversion level, three
trading strategies are available for banks in the OTC derivatives market as follows:
A- Hedging which can be followed in cases of a low risk-averse bank with an existing
idiosyncratic exposure, or a high risk-averse bank with an existing idiosyncratic
exposure.
B- Speculation which might be followed in cases of a low risk-averse bank with an
existing idiosyncratic exposure, or a low risk-averse bank without an existing id-
iosyncratic exposure.
C- No-Action which might be followed in case of a high risk-averse bank without an
existing idiosyncratic exposure.
The purpose for which a bank uses the OTC derivatives market determines its vul-
nerability to market risk. Banks face market risk to the extent that their positions are
not hedged.
3.3.2. Trading Mechanism
Banks use the OTC derivatives market to manage their idiosyncratic risk exposures
based on the trading strategies outlined above. For simplicity, we assume that banks are
only exposed to idiosyncratic interest rate risk exposures. Additionally, we assume that
the only way that banks can hedge or speculate interest rate movements is via the OTC
derivatives market using a plain vanilla fixed-for-floating interest rate swap based on a
given benchmark market interest rate. Also, trading in the OTC derivatives market is
governed by a specific set of rules as follows:
1- Periphery banks trade with core banks.
2- Periphery banks do not trade with other periphery banks.
3- Core banks trade with other core banks.
4- Core banks have no constraints on their capacity to enter into contracts with pe-
riphery banks.
5- Each bank trades based on its own strategy (see 3.3.1).
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3.3.3. Clearing Mechanism
Derivatives contracts can either be bilaterally or centrally cleared. In either case,
cleared contracts generate credit exposures which we quantify below.
For banks i and j, let Xcij be the amount that j owes i in position of contract c.
It then follows that max(Xcij; 0) is the exposure of i to j in contract c. This exposure
is the amount counterparty i risks losing upon the default of counterparty j. Also, let
Cij be the set of all outstanding contracts between i and j. It follows that the net




ij , 0}. Furthermore, let Xi
be the aggregate exposure of i. If all i’s contracts are bilaterally cleared, it is exposed to

















Similarly, if all i’s contracts are centrally cleared, i is exposed only to the central coun-
terparty H. Let CiH be the set of all i’s outstanding contracts that are centrally cleared
with H, and XciH be the exposure of i to H in contract c. It follows that i’s net exposure













Finally, let us assume that a percentage ω of all i’s contracts is centrally cleared, while
(1−ω) is bilaterally cleared, and that Ci is the set of all i’s outstanding contracts where
Ci = CiH +∑
N
j≠iC
ij, CiH = ω × Ci and ∑
N
j≠iC
ij = (1 − ω) × Ci. Thus, the net exposure
of i to the central counterparty H and all other counterparties j ≠ i can be obtained by

































A cleared contract results in two types of exposures: the potential future exposure
which is mitigated by the initial margin, and the current exposure which is mitigated by
variation margin (Lin and Surti, 2015). Given our focus on margin procyclicality due to
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market fluctuations, we use a single measure to quantify both exposures as illustrated in
3.3.3. Hence, we do not explicitly consider a contract’s initial margin. Instead, our focus
here is on variation margin.
The market value of the swap contract changes with market fluctuations. More specif-
ically, the sensitivity of the swap value to changes in the market interest rate can be
approximated by modified duration (Smith, 2011). Following the same logic, we approx-
imate the modified duration of a swap contract by β which represents the sensitivity of
the swap value to a one basis-point change in the benchmark market interest rate Rm.
Thus, for the pay-fixed side (long) of a swap contract, the basis-point change in the swap’s
market value ∆V can be estimated as a function of the change in market interest rate
∆Rm and β as follows:
∆V = β ⋅∆Rm (8)
where ∆V is measured per dollar of notional amount, and ∆Rm is measured in basis
points. We estimate the change in market interest rate as a stochastic process using
the Hull-White single factor model (Hull and White, 1990). For the receive-fixed side
(short), the change in the swap’s market value is −∆V . For instance, if market interest
rates increase, the new swap rates will be higher. As a result, the pay-fixed side of the
swap makes a profit as the market value of its contract increases, while the receive-fixed
side makes a loss due to the decline in the market value of its contracts. This implies
that the direction of ∆V depends on the direction of ∆Rm.
Due to changes in the market value of the swap contracts outstanding between banks
i and j, the net exposure of i to j fluctuates leading to variation margin calls if necessary.
If i’s aggregate exposure to j increases, i should recehive a variation margin from j, and

















where Bc is the notional amount of contract c. Cij+ and Cij− are the set of all contracts
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between i and j in which i is the pay-fixed side and pay-floating side, respectively. Now,
let vij be the variation margin required from bank i and due to bank j, it then follows
that:
vij =max{∆Xji , 0} (10)
where ∆Xji is the the aggregate change of j’s exposure to i which is equal to −∆Xij.
Following the same intuition as in Eq. 5-7, the total variation margin required from bank












where viH is the variation margin required from i and due to the central counterparty H.
We discuss how banks meet their variation margin calls in the following section.
4. Contagion and Systemic Risk
In this section, we analyse the potential contagion in the interbank market due to
distress spillover from the OTC derivatives market.
4.1. Distress Origination
As illustrated in 3.1, banks have holdings of both high quality liquid assets AHL and
low quality liquid assets ALL. Variation margin calls can only be paid using AHL, but
not ALL. This implies that banks may come under distress if their holdings of AHL are
not sufficient to cover a margin call. To illustrate this, assume that due to high market
interest rates volatility, a bank i is faced with an outsize variation margin call. Formally,
the condition under which bank i becomes distressed is:
AHLi − vi < 0 (12)
Eq. 12 implies that sufficiently high variation margins have the potential to trigger a
liquidity shortage at the bank. If a bank faces such a liquidity shortage, it needs to take
defensive actions to avoid defaulting on required payments. We assume that the only
way banks can obtain new funding is through the interbank market.
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4.2. Price of Liquidity
Distressed banks with insufficient holdings of AHL have two options to secure funding
to cover their variation margin calls. The first is to withdraw their lending extended to
other banks in the interbank market. In this case, the bank pays exit fees for prematurely
calling the loan. Let γi be the exit fees that the bank i has to pay. Thus, the maximum
amount of AHL that i can obtain by withdrawing its lending from the interbank market
is given by:
AHLi = (1 − γi)A
B
i (13)
The second option available for distressed banks to secure additional funding is to
use ALL as collateral to obtain AHL from the interbank market. In this case, the bank is
faced with two types of haircut that will be applied to ALL. The first is a system-wide
haircut α ∈ [0,1] which reflects the perceived system wide liquidity risk of ALL compared
to AHL. The second is a bank-specific haircut αi ∈ [0,1] to reflect the idiosyncratic risk
associated with a given bank. Therefore, the maximum amount of AHL that bank i can
obtain using its holdings of ALL as collateral is given by:
AHLi = (1 − α − αi) A
LL
i (14)
where α+αi < 1, which is necessary to put a non-negative lower bound on the amount of
AHL obtained using ALL.
A bank’s decision to follow a specific funding option of the above depends on its cost
to the bank. Thus, it follows from Eq. 13 and 14 that liquidity hoarding will continue as
long as it is less costly compared to using less liquid assets as collateral. Formally, when:
γi < (α + αi) (15)
In other words, when the amount of AHL that a bank can obtain by withdrawing a given
amount of interbank lending is higher than the amount of AHL that can be obtained by
pledging an equal amount of less liquid assets.
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4.3. Liquidity Hoarding Contagion
When banks decide to withdraw their lending from the interbank market, this may
lead to a liquidity hoarding contagion. We propose a liquidity hoarding contagion mecha-
nism in the spirit of Gai et al. (2011). To illustrate the dynamics of this liquidity hoarding
contagion, assume that a bank i becomes distressed as illustrated by Eq. 12. According
to Eq. 15, the bank hoards liquidity from the interbank market to cover its liquidity
shortage if γi < (α+αi). Further, assume that the bank withdraws an additional amount
of interbank lending as a precautionary action for subsequent margin calls. This amount
can be estimated as a fraction of its current margin call vi. Let Ahi be the amount hoarded
which can be estimated as:
Ahi =
(1 + λ)vi −AHLi
(1 − γi)
(16)
where λ is called the liquidity hoarding multiplier. Similarly, if γi > (α + αi), the bank
sells an amount of its less liquid assets to cover its liquidity shortage and obtain the
precautionary liquidity. Let Asi be the amount sold which can be estimated as:
Asi =
(1 + λ)vi −AHLi
(1 − α − αi)
(17)
Now assume that i is connected to a group of kini banks through its interbank lending
transactions. Also, assume that bank i’s interbank withdrawals are proportionally dis-
tributed among its borrowers. For contagion to spread beyond i, there should be at least
one bank j ∈ kini for which the following condition holds:





) < 0 (18)
Eq. 18 provides the tipping point for liquidity distress, that arise at bank i, to become
systemic and spread to other banks.
Once bank i starts to hoard liquidity and Eq. 18 is satisfied for other banks, liquidity
shortages can propagate through the network of interbank linkages. Subsequently, we
can derive the general condition under which any bank j becomes distressed as follows:













where koutj is the group of bank j lenders. Thus, a bank becomes distressed if the total
amount of its available AHLj is not sufficient to cover its variation margin, after accounting
for the loss of interbank funding that it might experience due to liquidity hoarding by its
counterparties.
4.4. Systemic Risk
Finally, we estimate the overall impact of distress spillover from the OTC derivatives
market as the cost of liquidity hoarding in the interbank market and the cost of selling
less liquid assets. We then estimate the systemic loss as the ratio of this amount to as a

















where Φ is an approximation to the systemic loss that the system encounters due to
liquidity hoarding or selling less liquid assets.
5. Model Calibration and Validation
In this section, we calibrate the parameters used in the model to approximate the basic
characteristics of the OTC derivatives and interbank markets, and provide an overview
of the simulation framework.
5.1. Model Calibration
We calibrate the model using data of the US banking system as of 31 December 2016.2
Table 1 displays the values used. Given that we are interested in banks that are active
in both the OTC derivatives market and the interbank market, we base our parame-
ters estimation on the group of insured commercial banks with assets greater than $3
billion. That said, we set the number of banks in our model equal to 245. For each
bank, the amount of total assets is set as Ai ∈ [100; 70,000] which are drawn from a
powerlaw distribution with power law exponent of 1.75 which is estimated directly from
the data set. The composition of each bank’s balance sheet is determined randomly
2Data is obtained from the web site of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) and is available at https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/nichome.aspx
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as percentages of total assets with parameters drawn from uniform distributions as fol-
lows. ratio of interbank assets ABi ≈ U(0.1%,10%), ratio of high quality liquid assets
AHLi ≈ U(1%,5%), ratio of low quality liquid assets A
LL
i ≈ U(10%,30%), ratio of inter-
bank liabilities LBi ≈ U(0.1%,10%), ratio of equity Ki ≈ U(7%,15%). Finally, other assets











[ Insert Table 1 about here ]
We construct the market network of both the interbank and the OTC derivatives
layers as a core-periphery structure following (Craig and von Peter, 2014). The number
of core banks is determined based on the relative size of each bank’s assets in a specific
layer of the network. To estimate this, we first rank banks and calculate the difference
in the log of assets of each bank and its succeeding bank. Banks with difference higher
that 0.10 are taken to be the core banks. Based on this, the number of core banks in
the interbank layer is set equal to 16 banks, and in OTC derivatives layer is set equal
to 9 banks. The core-core probability of connection ρCC is set equal to 0.65, and the
core-periphery probability of connection ρDC is set equal to 0.15.
The percentage of centrally cleared contracts is set equal to 72% as reported by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association in its OTC Derivatives Market Anal-
ysis on interest rate derivatives published in December 2016 (ISDA, 2016). Following
the interest rate swaps stress test developed by the Commodities and Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC, 2016), we use a market interest rate change of 60 basis points to
estimate the change in value of the swap contracts. In addition, we use a system wide
haircut percentage of 10% similar to that percentage recommended by the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements (BIS-IOSCO, 2013). The bank specific hair cut αi is drawn from
a uniform distribution U(0%,5%). We set the sensitivity of a derivatives contract value
to market interest rate risk β equal to 2, and the liquidity hoarding cost equal to 0.05.
Finally, we set the propensity for liquidity hoarding equal to 1 as in Gai et al. (2011).
5.2. Model Validation
We validate the model to confirm that it produces interbank and OTC derivatives
markets that resemble the real markets based on individual bank decisions on trading in
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the OTC derivatives market. The model is validated based on a comparison between the
features of the model’s network topology and those features observed in read data.
[ Insert Figure 1 about here ]
Degree distribution of both the derivatives and the interbank layers of the market
network are shown in Figure 1. The figure shows the cumulative density function (CDF)
of the degree distribution. The power law exponents are 1.75 in the case of the interbank
layer and 2.15 in the case of the derivatives layer. Overall, these distributions show a good
match with typical core-periphery networks from different markets including Germany
(Craig and von Peter, 2014), Italy (Fricke and Lux, 2015), Mexico (Martinez-Jaramillo
et al., 2014), U.K. (Langfield et al., 2014), and U.S. (Li and Schürhoff, 2014; Markose
et al., 2012).
6. Results
In this section, we describe the main results of our paper. We first provide an overview
of the simulations framework. Then, we provide the results of a baseline simulation
based on the initial parameters as shown in Table 1. Finally, we extend the analysis
to explore the impact of central clearing, interconnectedness and other factors on the
distress spillover from the OTC derivatives market to the interbank market.
6.1. Simulations Framework
The procedure of the model is illustrated by Figure 2. At the beginning of the sim-
ulation, t = 0, banks’ balance sheets, the interbank network are set up according to the
initial values of parameters as shown in Table 1. At t = 1, banks develop their own
strategies, then trading and clearing take place in the OTC derivatives market as shown
in section 3.3. At t = 2, margin calls are calculated as derived in Eq. 11. For each bank,
distress is assessed based on Eq. 12. Then, based on the available funding options, the
tipping point for liquidity hoarding contagion is assessed as in Eq. 18. Finally, systemic
loss is approximated as shown by Eq. 20.
[ Insert Figure 2 about here ]
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We typically run 100 simulations and report the average. The main output of each
simulation is the systemic loss due to liquidity hoarding and the number of distressed
banks. The baseline simulation is based on the initial values of the model parameters.
Some of these values are adjusted in the subsequent experiments to test other hypotheses.
6.2. Systemic Liquidity Risk
As a benchmark, we begin by analysing the dynamics of distress spillover from the
OTC derivative market to the interbank market. The main factor of impact here is mar-
gin procyclicality as derived by the change in the benchmark market interest rate ∆Rm.
The change in ∆Rm affects all contracts simultaneously. This is similar to a parallel shift
in the zero yield curve. We do not explicitly model any convexity effect of the interest
rate change as the modified duration β is assumed to account for this effect. Figure 3
shows the systemic loss and the number of distressed banks over a range of 0 to 100 basis
point of ∆Rm.
[ Insert Figure 3 about here ]
The dynamics of systemic risk captured in this figure varies as follows. At low levels
of ∆Rm, the change in value of derivatives contracts is limited and lead only to normal
variation margin calls that can be met by normal holdings of high quality liquid assets.
The level of systemic risk in this case is at its minimum level and none of the banks is
distressed. As the level of ∆Rm increases to moderate levels, the distress spillover tipping
point is reached. The change in value of derivatives contracts lead to variation margin
calls that exceed the holdings of high quality liquid assets of some banks. The only option
available for these banks to fund their margin calls is to hoard liquidity from the inter-
bank market. This is due to the fact that in our benchmark model the liquidity hoarding
cost is less than the total haircut that these banks might be subject to if they try to sell
less liquid assets. The level of systemic risk at this stage is still limited due to the fact
that distressed banks are small banks with limited share in the interbank lending and
borrowing activities. At high levels of ∆Rm, the change in value of derivatives contracts
becomes significant and the number of banks with variation margin calls that exceed their
normal holdings of high quality liquid assets increases. At this stage, the level of systemic
risk becomes significant due to the fact that some interbank dealers become distressed.
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When a dealer decides to hoard liquidity, systemic loss increases significantly because of
the dealer’s large share in the interbank lending and borrowing activities.
Thus, our benchmark model seems to be consistent with the findings of Lee (2013)
that the interbank market can be vulnerable to systemic liquidity shortages due to knock-
on effects through interbank linkages. Our findings are also consistent with the evidence
on herding in the interbank market during the financial crisis of 2008 (van den End
and Tabbae, 2012). Moreover, these findings give rise to the importance of prudent
liquidity risk management practices at the bank level that consider systemic implications
of financial distress. Banks should maintain sufficient liquidity to limit the chances that
high margin requirements would cause liquidity distress for them. In addition, the impact
of market volatility should be adequately accounted for when setting liquidity coverage
ratios of banks as required by the new Basel III standards.
6.3. Impact of Central Clearing
We now move to assess the impact of central clearing compared to bilateral clearing
on the distress spillover from the OTC derivatives market into the interbank market. We
assume that an average percentage ω of all the derivatives contracts traded is centrally
cleared through the central counterparty. However, unlike the benchmark case in which
we calibrate ω to be 72%, here we assess systemic risk over the whole range of central
clearing from 0% to 100%.
[ Insert Figure 4 about here ]
Figure 4 shows the results of this exercise which reveal a striking finding. The per-
centage of centrally cleared contracts compared to bilaterally cleared contracts positively
affects the systemic risk propagation within the interbank market. The systemic liquid-
ity hoarding increases with ω, although not significantly. One reason that explains this
finding is the difference in the timing of cash flows under central and bilateral clearing.
Although the value of margin calls are the same, in practice the timing of cash flows
is different. In the case of central clearing, banks with negative values are required to
post their margin requirements immediately while banks with positive values receive their
margin in the following period. Conversely, in the case of bilateral clearing all cash flows
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are received at the same period. This implies that banks can use these receipts from
margin calls as caution against sudden liquidity withdrawal which limits the systemic
liquidity risk in the case of bilateral clearing compared to central clearing.
Our findings about the impact of central clearing on systemic liquidity risk comple-
ments previous studies that focus on its impact on counterparty credit risk (e.g. Acharya
and Bisin, 2014; Loon and Zhong, 2014) and collateral demand (e.g. Duffie and Zhu,
2011; Cont and Kokholm, 2014; Garratt and Zimmerman, 2015). We focus on the day-
to-day margining and funding practices in OTC derivatives markets. Our finding that
central clearing might in fact increase systemic liquidity risk sheds light on the overlooked
impact of margin requirements on funding liquidity risk. An impact that arises due to
margin procyclicality which occurs when margin requirements rise at times of market
stress, leading to even more stress. Also, these findings emphasize the need of banks
to consider the impact of central clearing on their margin requirements and accordingly
liquidity risk management. Banks with derivatives exposures that are being moved from
bilateral clearing to central clearing as required by regulations should expect increases
in required daily cash flows to meet their margin requirements. Thus, banks should ade-
quately account for this adverse impact of central clearing when setting liquidity coverage
ratios.
6.4. Impact of Interconnectedness
Next, we assess the impact of interconnectedness in the interbank market on the
propagation of systemic risk within the system. We use density as shown by Eq. 3 as a
measure of interconnectedness of the interbank network. The value of the network den-
sity in the benchmark scenario is calibrated to be 0.15. Here, we explore the dynamics
of the model over a range for density from 0.01 to 0.25, while using the same values of
other parameters as in the benchmark model.
Figure 5 shows the results of this exercise. As can be seen form Panel (A) the value
of systemic risk seems to be unaffected by the level of connectivity within the interbank
market. This finding might seem counterintuitive at first sight given numerous studies
that confirm the role of interconnectedness in systemic risk propagation (see e.g. Eisen-
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berg and Noe, 2001; Furfine, 2003; Freixas et al., 2000; Allen and Gale, 2000). However,
this might be justified by considering that systemic risk is measured as the system wide
loss due to liquidity shortage at some banks which results from elevated margin calls.
These margin calls originate in the OTC derivatives market and are not affected by the
degree of connectivity in the interbank market. Nevertheless, interconnectedness in the
interbank market affects the number of distressed banks as shown in Panel (B). At higher
levels of connectivity, when a bank decides to withdraw funding it affects more banks and
the same level of systemic liquidity loss is divided between a larger number of banks. This
explains why systemic loss is not affected while the number of distressed banks increases
with density.
[ Insert Figure 5 about here ]
In addition, the results shown here highlights another adverse impact of interconnect-
edness on bank risk. It is widely argued that interconnectedness affects counterparty
credit risk either through concentration of exposures or through boosting default prop-
agation in dense networks. Nevertheless, as we show here, interconnectedness can also
affect liquidity risk adversely through its impact on the propagation of liquidity distress
within the interbank market network. Banks, thus, need to take a proactive approach to
liquidity risk management by actively monitoring interconnectedness on an ongoing basis.
But given that interconnectedness cannot be observed by a single bank as it requires map-
ping all counterparties data to identify and illustrate overall exposures, there is a need for
a system regulator to monitor any concentration of risk that might result in unexpected
losses. Still, a bank needs to ensure that it has accurate and reliable data about its own
counterparties to ensure it becomes aware of any areas in which interconnectedness is
introducing more risk than expected. A bank can then adjust its reserves and change
its strategy while there is still time before being hit by liquidity distress from other banks.
6.5. Impact of Haircut
In this exercise, we assess the impact of haircut rates on the propagation of systemic
liquidity risk in the interbank market. The dynamics in systemic risk in this case results
from the change in the average haircut that a bank might be subject to when selling less
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liquid assets to fund a margin call. The average haircut includes both the system wide
haircut and the average bank-specific haircut α + ᾱi. Here, we explore the dynamics of
the model over a range for the haircut from 0.01 to 0.10, while using the same values of
other parameters as in the benchmark model.
The results are shown in Figure 6. Panel (A) shows that systemic risk is negligible
for a haircut set at low level. It then increases with the increases in the haircut level, and
finally converges to a level similar to those obtained in the benchmark model. Recall that
a distressed bank has two options to fund a margin call: interbank liquidity withdrawals
and selling less liquid assets. The decision of selecting one option over the other depends
on the comparison between the cost of liquidity hoarding γ and the average total haircut
α + ᾱi. Given that the maximum cost of liquidity hoarding γ is set to be 0.05, a dis-
tressed bank will sell less liquid assets as long as (α + ᾱi) < 0.05. Beyond this threshold,
a distressed bank finds it less costly to hoard liquidity from the interbank market with
a cost that is capped at 0.05 as in the benchmark model. The same notion is confirmed
in Panel (B). The number of distressed banks increase with the the increase in haircut
as more banks would now withdraw liquidity from the interbank market leading other
banks to become distressed.
[ Insert Figure 6 about here ]
The findings shown in this section provide some insight into the role of liquidity
provider of last resort. In distress times, a central bank may stand ready to act as a
temporary market maker of last resort by providing low haircut rates for banks willing to
fund their liquidity needs. The aim would be to improve the liquidity of distressed banks
and limit the spillover of distress to other market participants. Also, these findings have
some implications at the bank level. An effective liquidity risk management framework
should consider the possibility and expected levels of haircuts during distress times. This
implies that banks should ensure that their holdings of liquid assets are of sufficient qual-
ity to limit the possibility that they would be subject to high levels of haircuts in times
of financial distress. In addition, the impact of haircuts should be adequately accounted
for when setting liquidity coverage targets.
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6.6. Sensitivity Analysis
The effect of margin procyclicality on systemic liquidity risk depends on some mod-
elling assumptions. In this section, we explore how the implications for distress spillover
from the OTC derivatives market to the interbank market change when we modify some
assumptions of the benchmark model.
6.6.1. Liquidity hoarding multiplier
The liquidity hoarding multiplier λ is used to capture the average level of panic in the
interbank market. In the benchmark model we assumed that banks hoard liquidity only
to the extent that covers their liquidity needs in the OTC derivatives market. However,
the interbank market has witnessed times of a lending freeze and high levels of liquidity
hoarding during the financial crisis of 2008 (van den End and Tabbae, 2012). Thus, it
is reasonable to assume higher levels for λ. We run another simulation to explore the
dynamics of systemic risk using a range of λ ∈ [1,3]. The results are shown in Figure
7. Both systemic loss and the number of distressed banks increase with the increase
in λ. This result confirms the notion that when uncertainty increases in the interbank
market banks hoard larger amounts of liquidity which leads to more panic and increases
the number of banks that become distressed.
[ Insert Figure 7 about here ]
6.6.2. Modified duration
In our model, market interest rate change is assumed to be common across all the
derivatives contracts. It cannot be hedged or diversified away and lead to changes in the
contract value. The sensitivity of a derivatives contract to changes in market interest
rates is approximated by β as illustrated by Eq. 8. In our baseline calibration, we set
β = 2. However, it is entirely possible that real values of β can be lower or higher than
this value. We run another simulation to explore the dynamics of systemic risk using a
range of β ∈ [0,3]. The results are shown in Figure 8. As illustrated, systemic risk is
limited at low levels of β. Nevertheless, both systemic loss and the number of distressed
banks increase with further increases in β. This result confirms the notion that higher
sensitivity leads to higher changes in the derivatives contract value which in turn results
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in higher margin calls. The elevated margin calls make more banks vulnerable to liquidity
shortage and increases systemic loss.
[ Insert Figure 8 about here ]
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the distress spillover from the OTC derivatives market into
the interbank market. We focus on the impact of margin procyclicality in the OTC
derivatives market on systemic liquidity risk in the interbank market.Our work brings
together the micro-structure and the macro-structure of these markets within a quanti-
tative framework to show how market volatility would lead to contagion among market
participants. In so doing, we focus on a specific question that has recently risen to the
top of policy agendas: how does margin requirements coupled with interbank propensity
for liquidity hoarding affect the systemic risk propagation in a financial network of banks?
Given that the model reproduces the qualitative features of the data, we use it to
investigate some of the policy implications of margin requirements. To this end, the gen-
eral approach followed is to perturb the OTC derivatives market with an interest rate
shock and analyse the systemic risk propagation within the interbank market. The model
demonstrates that margin procyclicality derived by interest rate volatility can lead to the
onset of a systemic liquidity shortage within the interbank market. It also shows that
central clearing might in fact increase the possibility of a systemic liquidity crisis due to
tight margin requirements. Consistent with previous evidence, the model predicts that
interconnectedness amplifies the effect of systemic risk. The model also shows that hair-
cut levels affects the possibility of a systemic liquidity crisis, and highlights the potential
role of a market maker of last resort in limiting this possibility.
Overall, the results of our paper illustrate the tension between the micro-level deci-
sions of individual banks and the macro-level outcomes of these decisions. During stress
time, banks make decisions about their interbank lending that are rational from each
individual bank perspective. However, from a systemic perspective, these decisions gen-
erate undesirable results. A decision of a single bank to hoard liquidity in the interbank
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market might spread the liquidity hoarding contagion to other banks causing systemic
loss. This systemic loss results from the cost of liquidity withdrawals of interbank lending
which are endogenously driven by bank’s propensity for liquidity hoarding during distress
times. This contagion dynamic is thus characterized by a self fulfilling process among
banks.
Our model is the first attempt to analyze the effects of margin requirements on sys-
temic liquidity risk. Since the model is stylized, it abstracts from some important factors
that could affect our conclusion. For instance, the model does not consider the possibil-
ity that selling less liquid assets could lead to a fire sale and distress asset prices. Also,
we consider only one type of derivatives contracts, and thus it is not straightforward to
generalize the results to all types of OTC derivatives exposures. Nevertheless, the work
presented here can be extended in different ways. For example, different structures of the
financial network can be investigated to explore the effect on systemic risk propagation.
Also, It would be helpful to investigate the extent to which a bank is subject to margin
procyclicality based on its risk aversion which plays an important role in the direction
of its trades. Finally, another extension may involve the effects of banks’ balance sheet
heterogeneity on the systemic risk propagation.
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Parameters Description Baseline Values
N Number of banks 245
NCoreB Number of core banks in the interbank layer 16
NCoreD Number of core banks in the OTC derivatives layer 9
ABi Interbank assets of bank i ≈ U(0.1%,10%) of total assets
AHLi High-quality liquid assets of bank i ≈ U(1%,5%) of total assets
ALLi Low-quality liquid assets of bank i ≈ U(10%,30%) of total assets
AOi Other assets of bank i Residual
LBi Interbank liabilities of bank i Endogenous
LOi Other liabilities of bank i Residual
Ki Capital of bank i ≈ U(7%,15%) of total assets
ρCC Probability of core-to-core connection 0.65
ρCP Probability of core-to-periphery connection 0.15
ρPP Probability of periphery-to-periphery connection 0.00
∆Rm Change in market interest rate in basis points 60
ω Central clearing percentage 72%
β Measure of modified duration 2
λ Liquidity hoarding multiplier 1
γ Liquidity hoarding cost ≈ U(0%,5%)
α System-wide haircut 10%
αi Bank-specific haircut ≈ U(0%,5%)
Table 1: Description of parameters and their initial values that are used in the baseline simulation. The
values of some parameters are determined endogenously during each run.
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Fig. 1: Degree distribution of both the derivatives and the interbank layers of the market network. The
figure shows the cumulative density function (CDF) of the degree distribution based on the average of
100 simulations.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Set up banks’ balance sheets Trading Strategies Margin Calls
Set up interbank network Trading and Clearing Spillover Contagion
Systemic Risk
Fig. 2: Simulation Framework
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Fig. 3: Stylized Systemic Liquidity Crisis. The simulation runs using parameters in Table 1. Φ is the
systemic loss due to liquidity hoarding, NΦ is the number of distressed banks and ∆Rm is the basis point
change in the benchmark market interest rate. The result is based on the average of 100 simulations.
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Fig. 4: Impact of central clearing on systemic liquidity risk. The simulation runs using parameters in
Table 1 with varying central clearing percentage values. Φ is the systemic loss due to liquidity hoarding,
NΦ is the number of distressed banks and ω is the percentage of central clearing. The result is based on
the average of 100 simulations.
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Fig. 5: Impact of interconnectedness on systemic liquidity risk. The simulation runs using parameters
in Table 1 with varying network density values. Φ is the systemic loss due to liquidity hoarding, NΦ is
the number of distressed banks and d is density. The result is based on the average of 100 simulations.
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Fig. 6: Impact of haircut on systemic liquidity risk. The simulation runs using parameters in Table
1 with varying haircut values. Φ is the systemic loss due to liquidity hoarding, NΦ is the number of
distressed banks and α + ᾱi is the total haircut. The result is based on the average of 100 simulations.
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Fig. 7: Sensitivity analysis of the liquidity hoarding multiplier.The simulation runs using parameters in
Table 1 with varying liquidity hoarding multiplier values. Φ is the systemic loss due to liquidity hoarding,
NΦ is the number of distressed banks and λ is the liquidity hoarding multiplier. The result is based on
the average of 100 simulations.
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Fig. 8: Sensitivity analysis of the derivatives contract value sensitivity to changes in market interest
rates. The simulation runs using parameters in Table 1 with varying modified duration values. Φ is the
systemic loss due to liquidity hoarding, NΦ is the number of distressed banks and β is the measure of
modified duration. The result is based on the average of 100 simulations.
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